Zambia Social Science Journal
Volume 1 | Number 1

Article 5

5-1-2010

Fostering Food Market Development in Zambia
Gelson Tembo
University of Zambia

Antony Chapoto
Michigan State University

Thomas Jayne
Michigan State University

Michael Weber
Michigan State University

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/zssj
Part of the Agricultural and Resource Economics Commons, and the Growth and Development
Commons
Recommended Citation
Tembo, Gelson; Chapoto, Antony; Jayne, Thomas; and Weber, Michael (2010) "Fostering Food Market Development in Zambia,"
Zambia Social Science Journal: Vol. 1: No. 1, Article 5.
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/zssj/vol1/iss1/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Zambia Social Science Journal by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information,
please contact jmp8@cornell.edu.

Fostering Food Market Development in
Zambia

Gelson Temboa, Anthony Chapotob, Thomas Jayneb, and
Michael Weberb
aUniversity

of Zambia and bMichigan State University

This article assesses major features of the Zambian agricultural market that have
led to the underdevelopment of the staple food marketing system, reviews existing
empirical evidence explaining the variable performance of the maize sub-sector,
and suggests potential corrective measures. As smallholder farmers in agricultural
markets are considered to be vitally important to the attainment of food security,
special attention is placed on how the current system affects these farmers, and
on how to foster improved participation. The role and potential of new generation
cooperatives is also considered. We identify seven major areas in need of serious
and coordinated attention if the state of the agricultural sector and marketing
functions is to improve.
1. Introduction
The availability, access to and affordability of food is a highly politicised issue
throughout the world. In much of southern Africa, there is a widespread view that
governments are responsible for ensuring that their populations have reliable access
to food (Bratton and Mattes, 2003). It is generally agreed that well-functioning
agricultural markets are crucial for sustained rural income growth and food security.
It is also clear that the food markets in the region require improvements in basic
infrastructure and operating rules, and that even with some of these improvements
being made, markets are still burdened by high costs and risks. Additionally, the
presence of efficiently functioning markets is not in itself sufficient, as food prices can
and often do fluctuate widely between the bands of import and export parity. The size
of this price band in Zambia, for instance, is typically high, and this is due to high
transport costs, storage costs, and transaction costs of trade. These problems have
been an important rationale for the protectionist approach that Zambia and many
Sub-Saharan African countries continue to adopt today.1
However, this protectionist approach to public sector involvement in agriculture
has several shortcomings. In Zambia, for example, marketing boards that have
attempted to provide a guaranteed output market and a source of inputs for farmers
have often proved to be costly and unsustainable. Farmers also complain of late
payments and corruption. Moreover, the marketing boards have also been largely
unable to maintain food prices within tolerable price bands. In the most recent
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2008/09 season, maize prices soared to over US$400 per tonne even though the
Food Reserve Agency (FRA) was tasked with undertaking marketing and
stockholding operations to ensure adequate supplies and tolerable prices. For most
countries, the pressure to find a less costly alternative to marketing boards has
been mounting since the late 1980s, particularly due to declining revenue bases
and waning efficiency in government marketing institutions. While widely embraced
in principle, the extent to which liberal market policies have been implemented has
varied from country to country. Zambia is among those still pursuing a more direct
public sector involvement and a protectionist approach.
Since 1995, the FRA has been largely responsible for conducting the
government’s agricultural policy. More recently, the Fertiliser Support Programme
(FSP), which offers significant Fertiliser subsidies for smallholder farmers, has
also been a key component of the Zambian government operations. While the
current environment, in theory, encourages the private sector to perform market
functions alongside the public sector, it is often prevented from doing so through
discretionary trade policy instruments such as export bans and restrictions, import
tariffs, and government import programmes.
This (semi-) reversal from the principles of the reforms of the early 1990s, in
which the government’s role was seen as that of primarily facilitating the private
sector, has been justified by the argument that the private sector has failed to
perform the marketing functions. The government considers itself morally
responsible to ensure that the producers and consumers alike are not solely at the
mercy of the unpredictable market forces. Thus, in effect, we have a dual
agricultural marketing system in which the private sector, at least in part, competes
with the government in certain marketing functions. While addressing some of the
problems arising from market reforms (e.g., providing support prices to farmers in
remote areas, at least at times when the marketing boards are in the market, and
increased access by smallholder farmers to cheaper inputs through the Fertiliser
support programme, etc.), this dual system has presented its own challenges.
Recent assessments of the performance of the marketing reforms have been,
at best, mixed. Some scholars have argued that the conventional view that the
private sector had failed under the free market system fails to appreciate the fact that
there are two sides to the success of such a policy framework – an effective private
sector, and an effective, incentive-enhancing government. Even the most ardent
advocates of liberalisation realised that governments would need to fulfill certain
tasks in order for markets to function effectively; provide a stable and transparent
policy environment, invest in public goods to reduce the costs and risks of trade
and production, provide the institutions for contract enforcement, risk-mitigation and
incentives to invest, etc. Whether markets, states, or both are responsible for the
weak growth of African agriculture over the past several decades is difficult to
address empirically. Whatever the case may be, most scholars and policy makers
are in agreement that the status quo is once again not working as a means to
sustain broad-based agricultural development. Use of existing empirical evidence
to inform these concerns and identify options for alternative courses of action has
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been very limited. Moreover, while some empirical evidence already exists, there are
still information gaps that, if filled, could help to further improve the management of
the agricultural sector in general and the agricultural market in particular.
It is against this backdrop that this article is written with two key objectives:
firstly to highlight some of the key features of the Zambian agricultural market
which have led to the underdevelopment of the staple food marketing system in
the country; and secondly to use existing empirical evidence to explain the dismal
performance of the maize sub-sector and to suggest possible alternative
corrective measures.
As participation of smallholder farmers in the agricultural markets is
considered key to the attainment of food security, special attention is deliberately
placed on how the current system impacts this category of farmers and some of
the key features that may foster their improved participation. The role and potential
of the new generation cooperatives are also considered.
The remainder of this article is organised into six sections: section 2 briefly
looks at the historical evolution of Zambia’s agricultural policies; section 3
describes the structure of the agricultural sector in Zambia; section 4 analyses
the current levels of public sector support and its impacts on the development of
Zambian agriculture; section 5 discusses the need to match stated priorities with
implementation practices; section 6 deals with marketing farmer organisations
and their potential to lower marketing costs; and section 7 presents conclusions
and potential policy options.

2. Historical Evolution of Agricultural Policies
Current food policy issues in Zambia, as is the case for much of eastern and
southern Africa, are rooted in a historical context. Understanding the political and
economic pressures driving food policy decisions in the region requires an
understanding of the role of maize as a strategic political crop in this region of
Africa. For many African nations, maize became the cornerstone of an implicit and
sometimes explicit social contract that post-independence governments made
with their people to redress the neglect of smallholder agriculture during the
colonial period (Jayne and Jones, 1997). Maize now accounts for 25-30% of the
gross national value of smallholder crop output and roughly 40% of Zambia’s
caloric intake (Zulu, Jayne and Beaver, 2006).
Since Zambia achieved its independence in 1964, a prominent goal of
government policy has been to promote smallholder welfare, primarily through the
use of maize production incentives. The state initially invested heavily in cropbuying depots, first through the National Agricultural Marketing Board
(NAMBOARD) and later through the Zambia Cooperative Federation (ZCF). The
government’s policy initially achieved great success in the 1970s and early 1980s
(Howard and Mungoma, 1996). Up until the late 1980’s, the overall maize
production and yields per hectare were trending upwards despite significant
fluctuations. Government funded extension services, seed research, and Fertiliser
subsidies (used mainly on maize) resulted in a continued rise in output and yield
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per hectare. Unfortunately, this policy resulted in increasingly unmanageable
costs, and diverted resources from other complementary infrastructure
developments that were necessary for sustainable agricultural growth.
By the late 1980s, treasury costs of state Fertiliser and maize marketing
operations were so large that they also contributed to macroeconomic instability
and hyperinflation (Jansen and Muir, 1994). Increased donor leverage over policy
then helped propel the input and crop marketing systems toward reform. The
government began to take steps to liberalise maize input and product markets,
and discontinued consumer subsidies on maize meal.
With the continuing desire for market stabilisation, the Zambian government
established the FRA in 1996, which was tasked with holding strategic grain
reserves. Unlike its predecessor, NAMBOARD, which was the sole buyer and
seller of grain in Zambia, the FRA was originally created to hold buffer stocks in
order to dampen price variability. The agency was also to provide liquidity in the
maize market during the initial years of market liberalisation, as the private sector
was in the process of establishing itself. Although FRA’s original mandate did not
include a price support function, the agency was soon instructed to purchase
maize in remote areas where production was unlikely to be profitable under
commercial conditions. In addition, Fertiliser distribution was added to FRA’s
activities, and the agency accepted maize as in-kind payment for the Fertiliser,
further entrenching its maize purchase activities (Govereh et al., 2002).
Up until the 2000/2001 marketing season, FRA involvement in the buying
and selling of grain was very limited, and all purchases and sales were done
using a tender process. With an increase in budgetary support from the
government and the looming drought of 2001/2002, the FRA found itself
becoming one of the major actors in the maize market. The FRA started
announcing maize floor prices and became the so called buyer of last resort. In
2006, the FRA’s mandate in the maize sector was further expanded. Starting in
May 2005, the FRA began ramping up its buying activities and has continued to
buy a large portion of local production, now approximately 34% of the country’s
domestically marketed maize (see table 1). Thus, the government has arguably
become the dominant player in the maize market.
A key issue facing the Zambian government is the need to import maize
during production shock years. Marketed supplies from local production are
generally exhausted eight to ten months after harvest. Political and economic
stability are importantly tied to ensuring adequate supplies of maize meal at
tolerable prices in urban and mining areas. Accordingly, the government has
remained involved in arranging maize imports, subsidising the price at which it
offers maize imports or local purchases to large millers. For example imports were
sought in the range of US$165 per tonne in 2002, when the market price of maize
from South Africa was at least US$230 per tonne, US$274 per tonne in 2009 whilst
local maize prices was at least US$400 per tonne (Nijhoff et al., 2002; Jayne et
al., 2009). Table A1 in the Appendix presents the salient features and changes in
maize marketing and trade policy between 1990 and 2009.
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Table 1: Small/medium scale smallholder maize output, FRA purchases and
purchases as % of production.
Production
Season

Marketed output
Maize production from production

FRA
purchases

FRA purchases
as % of smallholder
marketed surplus

1995/96

1178

350

16

5

1997/98

724

157

200

127

1996/97

1998/99

1999/2000
2000/01

2001/02

2002/03

2003/04

2004/05

2005/06

2006/07

2007/08

805

929

1123
939

948

1,126
1217
820

1107

1104
988

‘000 metric tonnes

185

217

270

197

190

284

352

193

358

398

357

75

23

35

155
25

55

105
79

389

396
74

41
11

13

79

13

19

30

41

109

99.5
21

Source: Post Harvest surveys (PHS), Crop Forecast surveys (CFS) for maize production
and marketed surplus for the years 2006/07, 2007/08, and 2008/09, and FRA purchases
from FRA data files.

3. The Structure of Zambia’s Agricultural Sector
Zambia’s agricultural sector is characterised by over 1.4 million smallholder farm
households that account for a significant proportion of total agricultural output
(Ministry of Agriculture and Co-operatives (MACO), 2009).2 Perhaps unsurprisingly,
the majority of government agricultural support is directed toward this category of
farmers. Still, approximately 2,000 large scale farmers contribute significantly to
total crop production and sale, especially for sugar and wheat.

Most Smallholder Farms Have Small Landholdings
The majority of smallholder farmers have very small landholding sizes, even when
fallow fields are taken into account. About 40% of the smallholder farms cultivate
a hectare or less, and 20% cultivate less than half a hectare. Figure 1 shows the
distribution of smallholder landholding size and land cultivated in 2004.
With such land sizes, it is not possible for these farmers to earn sustainable
incomes from cropping unless substantial investments in productivity enhancements
are made and high-value crops are promoted. In section 4, we demonstrate that
effort in these areas on the part of the public sector is very low.
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Figure 1: Distribution of smallholder landholding size and land cultivated, 2004

A. Cumulative Distribution of Landholding Size (cultivated + fallow)

B. Cumulative Distribution of Cultivated Land Area

Jayne et al. (2008) report that paradoxically, a quarter of Zambia’s rural
population faces land shortages and perceptions of no additional land being
available to them despite the existence of underutilised arable land. The study
also shows that within a given district or village, there are very wide intra-village
differences in farm sizes. For example, within a given district, the top 25% of
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households tend to have ten times more land than the bottom 25% of households
(8.85 hectares versus 0.61 hectares). While average farm size (including rented
land) was found to be approximately 3.05 hectares, about one-third of all
households have access to one hectare or less. Factors found to be positively
correlated with increased access to land include level of productive assets, kinship
relations to local headman and the distance from roads and district towns. Female
headedness, proximity to towns and markets, and the duration of settlement of the
family in the area were found to be negatively correlated with land access.
The main implication of these findings is that most smallholder farmers tend to
have insufficient access to land despite its availability, and that improving such access
for the most land-constrained smallholder households might be an effective way to
reduce poverty. For small farms, incremental additions to land access are associated
with a large relative rise in income. Yet improving land access for smallholders is
fraught with difficulties: even in the presence of abundant land, reform is politically
difficult, expensive, and subject to rent-seeking. Market-assisted or community-based
approaches have also faced difficulties. Given the opportunity to allocate unused
land, Zambia may have more latitude to work with local authorities to give preferential
treatment to some of the most land-constrained smallholders. organisations such as
the Zambia Land Alliance have proposed such programs, but it remains to be seen
if the needed reforms can occur (Zambia Land Alliance, 2009).

Only a Few Smallholder Farmers Sell Maize
In addition to being a major staple food, maize is also a cash crop in Zambia, and
we would thus expect smallholder farmers to more readily commercialise it.
However, the evidence shows that a combination of inequitable land access,
inadequate access to other assets, and large variations in crop productivity across
households and regions contribute to considerable heterogeneity with respect to
smallholders’ position in maize markets. Rural household surveys in Zambia
indicate that small-scale farm households generally fall into one of the following
four categories: (i) net sellers, (ii) net buyers with production, (iii) buyers without
production, and (iv) households that are neither buyers nor sellers (see figure 2).
We consider the four categories in turn:
Net sellers of maize: in the 2007/08 marketing season, roughly 26% of all
smallholder farms produced and sold maize, with the majority relying solely on
this staple crop as a source of income. The specific figure is understandably higher
in good harvest years and lower during drought/excessive rain years. A very small
percentage of farmers account for the vast majority of maize sales, indicating a
need for two sub-groups within this category:
a) A small group of well-equipped farmers with 4 to 20 hectares of land,
(about 1-4% of the total rural farm population), that account for 50% of
marketed output from the smallholder sector. These farms tend to sell
between 5 and 50 tonnes of maize per farm in a given year.
b) A much larger group of smallholder farmers (about 20 to 25% of the total
rural farm population) that sell much smaller quantities of grain; between
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0.1 and 5 tonnes per farm. These households tend to be slightly better off
than households that buy grain, but the differences are relatively small.
Households selling maize have, for obvious reasons, tended to advocate the
continuation of government procurement of their grain, supporting the FRA and
looking for fixed, high prices. Unfortunately, empirical evidence has shown that
overall benefits from such government programs are minimal (Myers, 2005;
Govereh, Jayne, and Chapoto, 2008).
Net buyers of maize: these rural households constitute approximately 35% of
the rural population, with the exact number being higher in drought/excessive rain
years and lower in good production years. These households are generally poorer
and have smaller farm sizes and asset holdings than the median rural household.
They are directly hurt by higher grain prices.
Non-maize producing households that are buyers of maize: this sub-group is
typically comprised of 10-16% of the rural farm population. These households
have assets levels similar to those in category (ii). They do not produce maize, but
through other cropping and labour activities earn cash income.
Figure 2: Characteristics of rural smallholder farmers disaggregated by their
position in maize and maize meal markets, 2007/08

Source: 2008 CSO/FSRP Supplemental Survey

Households that neither buy nor sell maize: these households make up 2335% of the rural population in areas where maize is the dominant staple crop. In
parts of northern Zambia where cassava is the main staple, a sizable fraction of
the rural population is autarkic with respect to maize. Both positive and negative
shocks to maize production in a given year can shift households in and out of this
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market position, such that they have purchasing requirements or a surplus to sell.
However, this group of households tends to have the lowest average asset levels,
suggesting that their effective demand may be easily constrained.
Unfortunately, government marketing activities and policy decisions have thus
far been largely unresponsive to such statistics. For example, the FRA and the private
sector usually attempt to purchase the entire marketed maize surplus from the rural
areas, leaving virtually nothing for purchase in many communities during the lean
season, which occurs from December through March. The grain is instead bought
and hauled to urban centres, where it is sold to millers. This greatly disadvantages
the majority of the rural households, who are net buyers of grain. The fact that FRA
grain is supplied to large commercial millers, which sell relatively expensive maize
meal, further disadvantages the poor in urban areas who would prefer to purchase
grain from the market and send it to small, cheaper grinding mills. Evidence indicates
that many of the urban and rural poor rely on these less expensive ways of procuring
their maize meal as long as grain is available in local markets for purchase (Mwiinga
et al., 2002; Mason et al., forthcoming). However, when the supply of grain in local
markets tends to dry up, consumers are forced to switch to more expensive
packaged maize meal, or to consume less altogether. Mwiinga et al. (2002) estimate
that low-income urban households could save roughly 7-20% of their monthly income
if they were able to purchase grain and mill it into mugaiwa at a local grinding mill,
rather than relying on more expensive commercial alternatives.
Given the importance of maize purchases throughout rural areas, public
policy and programme efforts should pursue practical ways to strengthen
traditional on-farm storage practices and techniques. Likewise, marketing
extension training and orientation materials can help smallholders with possible
surplus supplies to consider more profitable options, such as on-farm storage and
later sales to rural market consumers.

Formal – Informal Market Dichotomy
Zambia’s agricultural sector is characterised by an inherent dichotomy in agricultural
marketing, with smallholder traders facing an underdeveloped informal marketing
system, and the more advanced large-scale traders and processors being part of a
formal marketing system. While the formal system provides a broader set of risk
management and mitigation mechanisms (such as commodity exchanges, forward
contracting, and advanced storage technology), the informal sector, with which much
of the smallholder farming community is associated, does not have such linkages.
Improved access to these hedging facilities and linkages with local and international
commodity exchanges can bolster agricultural marketing in Zambia. Some analysts
contend that the future of smallholder farming depends upon integrating the informal
sector with the formal sector (Jayne, Tembo, and Nijhoff, 2005).
There is thus an urgent need to develop a more formalised approach for
smallholder farmers, focusing on credible rural financial markets to improve trader
capacity to absorb surplus production. Despite the negative connotations
sometimes associated with private traders operating in Zambia, the majority are
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playing an important and growing role in fostering rural market development. While
the importance of access to credit in promoting improved farm technology is well
recognised, the role of trader finance is also crucial. A major source of inelastic
demand in traditional food markets is the constrained supply of trader finance
(Coulter and Shepherd, 1995 in Jayne et al., 2008). Market institutions such as
warehouse receipt schemes can inject liquidity into grain marketing systems, thus
allowing them to better absorb surplus production in good years. A warehouse
receipt system can also help reduce inter-temporal price risks while maintaining
crop quality. The development of these market institutions, however, depends on
the existence of supportive government policies. So far, attempts to develop
warehouse receipt systems and other innovative sources of trader finance in
Zambia have floundered due to direct government operations in crop markets that
have been incompatible with the development of these institutions. Decisionmakers and analysts alike need to seriously consider alternative methods
designed to facilitate the establishment of and smallholder participation in such
systems.

Regional Trade and Comparative Advantage
When combined with broad-based public investments, both local and international
trade can potentially increase market size and absorb excess production during
very good production years. Trade can also provide a source for additional
supplies during deficit periods. Trade can thus benefit the sector by increasing the
elasticity of demand faced by smallholder farmers. Elastic demand leads to price
stability, even in the presence of fluctuations in production.
In 1996, Southern African Development Community (SADC) member states
adopted a trade protocol to provide a framework for reform measures that sought
to liberalise intra-SADC trade and implement a mechanism for phased removals
of tariff and non-tariff barriers. The SADC– Trade Protocol (SADC-TP) aimed to
secure expanded regional markets by (1) exploiting economies of scale, (2)
providing attractive opportunities for foreign and domestic investments, (3)
improving value-adding processes, (4) stimulating efficient operation of commodity
and service markets, and (5) expanding exports and incomes. Zambia ratified the
SADC-TP, which stipulates that member states are required to offer duty-free
access to imports from the region. However, implementation of the protocol has
remained erratic, particularly in the area of agricultural trade. Intra-SADC
agricultural exports and imports have been characterised by disputes and
safeguard measures. Commodity import bans have, for instance, sometimes been
enacted when local producers have felt threatened. In Zambia, the government
applies export bans and import quotas haphazardly, making it difficult for the
private sector to develop informed and reliable expectations about the future.
Within the country, trade is further constrained by restrictions limiting the
movement of grain between districts.
Another challenge facing SADC-TP signatory states stems from varying
production and marketing costs, which tend to disadvantage the less developed
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member states. Zambia has one of the most expensive production and marketing
systems in the region. In 2001, the Zambia National Farmers Union (ZNFU)
estimated the cost of producing one tonne of maize at about US$140 in Zambia,
compared to US$110 and US$80 in Zimbabwe and South Africa respectively
(ZNFU, 2001). The average cost of transporting produce from farmers to markets
was estimated at US$15.25 per tonne in Zambia, compared to US$6.50 per tonne
in Zimbabwe and US$4 per tonne in South Africa. Countries such as Zambia often
point to statistics like these when making arguments against further liberalisation,
arguing that locally produced products would suffer unfairly.
A recent study of SADC members covering several years (1996-2006) reveals
that Zambia, on average, exports below potential to most trading partners. (Tembo
and Jayne, 2009). Improvements in Zambia’s export flows due to the SADC-TP
improved trade with Malawi and South Africa, but actually worsened trade with
Angola and Botswana. The fact that Zambia has been underperforming suggests
that either Zambia’s agricultural production sector was not able to respond to the
export opportunities created by the SADC-TP, or there existed impediments, policy
or otherwise, to frictionless trade. In general, although some success has been
achieved through regional integration efforts, many countries continue to practice
protectionist policies. The success of free trade relies upon responsive
infrastructure and institutions in and between the trading partner states.
While variations in factor costs are often used to justify multilateral trade,
several poor countries in the region have comparative disadvantages in most
commodities, which in theory promote one-way trade. In the case of Zambia, oneway trading has been further fuelled by trade policies that promote imports
(through reduced tariffs), export restrictions and, in some cases, bans. There are
two measures that can and should be adopted to correct the situation: deliberate
public investment to improve production and marketing efficiency, and predictable,
trade-enhancing policies. While it is important for Zambia to attain these,
achievement of the full breadth of benefits from trade can only be achieved if
trading partners also adopt trade-enhancing investment strategies and policies.

4. Public Sector Support and its Impacts
Zambia, like many other countries in the region, is characterised by extended
periods of under-investment in the agricultural sector. Many agricultural market
failure problems in Africa reflect an under-provision of the public goods necessary
to drive down the costs of marketing and contracting. Figure 3 shows trends in
government commitment to agriculture (on the left axis) and the proportion of
approved budget actually spent on the agricultural sector (right axis). The graph
shows that although the government has allocated as much as 30% of total budget
to agriculture in the past (1992), the proportion allocated has been both declining
and variable. In recent years, agriculture’s share has risen from 7.4% in 2000 to
12.5% in 2008.
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Figure 3: Trends in the share of agriculture in the national budget (1981-2009)
and proportion of approved funds actually released (1991-2008), Zambia

Source: Govereh et al. (2006) complemented by 2007- 2009 Estimates of Revenue and
Expenditure, Ministry of Finance and National Planning (MFNP), GRZ

At the time of signing the Maputo Declaration in 2003, Zambia committed 6.1%
of its national resources towards agriculture. This declaration committed Zambia’s
agriculture share of total expenditure to 10% by 2008. Following this declaration,
Zambia’s share of national resources going to agriculture has risen significantly
and has surpassed the 10% target. Zambia is therefore in the company of a few
African countries whose share of spending to agriculture is Comprehensive Africa
Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) compliant.3
Until 2002, the proportion of budgeted funds actually released has been highly
variable, constituting a substantial source of unpredictability. Since 2003, however
the government of Zambia has been more predictable and has taken measures to
ensure the full allocation of budgeted funds. One can only hope that Zambia will
neither slow down nor renege on future commitments. Despite high volumes of
spending, however, the returns on these investments have been low; agriculture’s
contribution to the economy is not growing and rural poverty levels remain high. An
investment analysis on Zambia by Thurlow et al. (2008) revealed that the
government will need to allocate 16% of its national spending to agriculture in order
to achieve and sustain growth of 6% per year (Govereh et al., 2009), given current
practices. Additionally, there remain problems with identifying highest priority and
high payoff investments that will truly stimulate growth in the sector.
The distribution of the agricultural budget in the recent past has not placed
enough emphasis on broad-based public investments. Most of the funds allocated
to the sector over the years have been spent on the so called poverty-reduction
programmes (PRPs), with Fertiliser subsidies (through the FSP) and maize price
stabilisation (through the actions of the FRA) accounting for between 50-70% of
the total budget over the last seven years (see figure 4).
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Figure 4: Proportion of Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, (MACO)
budget devoted to FRA and FSP (2001-2009), Zambia

Source: Chapoto and Weber 2009

Figure 5 shows a trend of allocating significant percentages of the agricultural
budget to the FSP and to the FRA. From 2008 to 2009, allocation to the FSP
increased from 57% to 76%. This trend has prevented real agricultural growth
drivers from obtaining severely needed resources. The agricultural sector has thus
stagnated and poverty levels have been on the rise. Irrigation development as a
means to mitigate drought and improve productivity, for example, has been high
on the government’s agenda for several years. However, very little actual spending
has gone towards funding this objective.
Figure 5: Composition of poverty reduction programmes, 2008 and 2009
2008 (Actual)

2009 (Announced)

Source: Chapoto and Weber, 2009
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Similarly, research and development endeavours have almost ground to a
halt due to lack of funds, adversely affecting and eroding the genetic advances
and refinements in the adaptation of improved practices and technologies. Existing
evidence based on empirical work by several scholars shows that sustained
investment in crop science, extension programmes, physical infrastructure, and
supportive policy present the greatest payoffs (Govereh et al., 2006; Mellor, 1976;
Byerler and Eicher, 1997; Alston et al., 2000; and Evenson, 2001).
The neglect of broad-based agricultural investments has increased the cost of
doing business for the private sector. For example, while efforts have been made by
the government to maintain major roads, most feeder roads have become
increasingly impassable over the years. Similarly, storage facilities are either in a bad
state or altogether unavailable to some of the market participants. Research and
extension activities that used to support development and the diffusion of improved
on-farm storage technologies have virtually disappeared in recent years. The
exchange function of marketing is also not fully facilitated by existing institutions.
Property rights and contract enforcement, for example, are almost non-existent, and
are often delayed or denied by a very slow and expensive conflict resolution process.
Another consequence of poor marketing infrastructure and institutions is
increased transaction costs. In the 2005/06 agricultural marketing season, it cost
US$135 to transport a metric tonne of maize grain from Johannesburg, South
Africa, to Lusaka, accounting for as much as 35% of the landed cost. Similarly,
high transaction costs are associated with intra-country trade.

Output Market
As has been discussed, food and agricultural policy in Zambia has, in recent years,
involved the re-emergence of direct parastatal operations in the maize market,
state restrictions on the private export of maize, and unpredictable changes in trade
tariff rates, quantities traded, and prices offered and paid by the FRA. In 2006, for
instance, the FRA nearly doubled the quantity of maize that it purchased from
200,000 metric tonnes in the previous year to 386,000 metric tonnes (table 1 in
section 2). Ostensibly, these state activities have been in response to perceived
failings of private trade to provide reliable markets and stable prices for smallholder
farmers’ surplus maize production (Jayne et al., 2009). In 2008’s budget allocation,
however, GRZ again moved to reduce the role of the FRA by lowering total
intended purchases to 80,000 metric tonnes. For the 2009/10 marketing season,
the Zambian press has already noted potential plans to again increase significantly
the role of the FRA in smallholder maize procurement. Unfortunately, this oscillation
is costly and often distorts the market.
In recent years, the government has also endeavoured to stabilise prices by
holding larger stocks of maize in reserves. In 2007, the FRA had 250,000 metric
tonnes in carryover stock, the largest in its history. While issues of capacity are yet
to be fully understood, managing large grain reserves is a costly venture involving
rotation decisions and other stock management activities (Hannusch and Tembo,
2004). If price stabilisation is deemed to be a necessary government activity, the
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added complication of timing market entry and exit requires an in-depth
understanding of the market. This entails frequent market studies, which Zambia,
like many other poor countries, has yet to undertake. Enhancing the capacity of
the Agricultural Market Information Centre (AMIC) and early warning systems
(e.g., improved timeliness of crop forecast surveys, activities of the meteorological
department) could help improve availability of timely market information.

Agricultural Growth
Even when growth strategies are agreed upon, implementation problems persist,
indicating the presence of additional challenges that need to be addressed. The
almost non-existent monitoring and evaluation mechanisms do little to discourage
corruption and leakages. Additionally, Fertiliser subsidies through the FSP, which
have over the years become the mainstay of government policy, have restricted the
government’s energy and ability to undertake broad-based investments. Government
involvement is thus subject to rent-seeking while also substituting for or crowding
out private spending. Investments in public goods can result in returns up to six times
higher than are currently being realised by the government (Haggblade, 2007).
The lack of appropriate government efforts has led to growth that has been
modest at best. Table 2 shows the relatively unimpressive performance of
Zambia’s smallholder agriculture. Between 1990 and 2005, crop output growth
was negligible, growing at around one percent, and fell significantly short of the
CAADP target of 6% per year. Smallholder maize output grew sluggishly, at rates
that were similarly much lower than the CAADP maize target of 4.8% per annum.
In fact, the only sub-sector that has grown close to expectations is cassava. Cotton
and more recently groundnuts have seen improved performance but are still
growing at rates below the desired targets.
Table 2: Growth rates in key agricultural indicators in Zambia, 1990 – 2006

Measure

1990 – 1994

1995 – 1999

2000-2005

(1)

(2)

Total crop value

-3.25

1.91

(3)
%

Cassava

3.30

11.86

Maize

Groundnuts
Cotton

Crop productivity
output per ha

Output per HH

Area planted per HH

-0.50
-5.70

0.66

(4)

(5)

1.31

1.09

6.09

3.60

4.33

5.54

1.62

-8.17

1.77

-3.88

-0.53

-2.95

-0.75

1.42

-1.81

1.02

-4.76

0.27

Source: Reproduced from Govereh et al. (2009)

1990 – 2005 CAADP 2015
Target

3.65

0.77

-0.65

0.49

2.96
3.40
-0.06

-0.42

-0.36

4.84

5.35
9.37
-

-

-
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Agricultural Productivity
Zambia has spent over 1.4 trillion Kwacha over a period of seven years, providing
subsidised Fertiliser under the FSP. However, average maize yields have remained
constant at 1.2 metric tonnes per hectare since the inception of the programme
(Chapoto and Weber, 2009; Lungu and Weber, 2009). Government resources are
thus being used inefficiently, and a reevaluation of the FSP and other government
activities may yield improved results. It is generally accepted that agricultural
productivity growth is a pre-condition for sustainable poverty reduction and improved
living standards in most of Sub-Saharan Africa. But the evidence suggests that
Zambia is failing to achieve productivity increases in the agricultural sector. The
challenge of improving farm productivity appears to have a straightforward solution:
use the power of crop science to generate improved farm technologies, put them
into the hands of small farmers, and provide them with the knowledge to get the
most out of these technologies. Over the past several decades, however, several
highly committed and well-funded efforts to kick-start such green revolutions in
Zambia have been thwarted by their inability to anticipate and address downstream
issues of marketing and governance (Jayne et al., 2009).
Stakeholders have frequently complained about the way the FSP is run and
have been calling for changes to the programme for a long time. However, such
changes alone may not remedy the problem, unless the shortcomings in
production and marketing programmes are simultaneously addressed. For
example, training farmers using extension workers and agro-dealers to raise farm
productivity may be important. Relevant issues such as proper farm management,
correct use of inputs, conservation farming, and post harvest concerns must also
be addressed. The MACO/ACF/FSRP coalition sponsored an FSP Reform Study
Tour in January of 2009. The results from this study suggest major reforms to the
FSP towards focusing on farmer training as well as improved input access through
an upgraded agro-dealer network (ACF, 2009).
As the Sasakawa/Global-2000 programmes have demonstrated, it is possible
for farmers to use improved seed and Fertiliser which, with management advice,
can lead to impressive yet temporary yield gains by small farmers. But once such
programs are withdrawn, several questions remain: how will farmers continue to
acquire the improved seed and Fertiliser? Who will supply these critical inputs to
them, and how will farmers acquire the financing and credit needed to afford these
inputs? Who will be responsible for the system-wide coordination of food value
chains, so as to ensure that important public and private investments are made to
effectively link farmers to the wholesalers, processors, retailers and ultimately the
consumer? These questions need to be answered as Zambia endeavours to
formulate a successful and sustainable approach to stimulating additional Fertiliser
use among small and medium-scale farmers. Resources are limited and the FSP,
even in a reformed format, cannot exist indefinitely.
Figure 6 shows historical trends in agricultural productivity, which demonstrate
that, as mentioned earlier, government policies were relatively successful up until
the 1980s. However, since the market reforms of 1991 a decline in absolute maize
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Table 3: Trends in maize yields, 1999/00 – 2007/08
Quintiles of
maize yield

Maize yield
1999/00a
2007/08b
(1)

1- Low

422

3-Mid

1373

5-High

3605

2

4-

National

aBased
bBased

858

kg/ha

(2)

62.79
416

898

2060

1630

1373

1265

3388

on 1999/00 PHS and 2001 supplemental survey to the 1999/00 PHS
on data from the 2007/08 CFS

production in Zambia has been witnessed. The implementation of food market
reforms meant the removal of Fertiliser subsidies, the abolition of pan-territorial
pricing, and the closure of maize collection depots in remote areas. Smallholder
farmers responsible for the bulk of the maize production were too poor to afford nonsubsidised fertilisers and, hence, diversified into other crops, thereby decreasing total
maize output. However, the overall reduction in subsidies to support maize production
and consumption appear to have caused important shifts in cropping patterns. Over
the 12-year period between the 1990/91 and 2002/03 seasons, the share of maize
in total smallholder crop output declined from 76% to 55%.
Figure 6: Maize production and yield trend, 1961 to 2008

Source: Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) stats up to 2006, complemented by
Zambia CFS surveys 2007 and 2008
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Supported by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and public
investments in research during the 1980s through the 1990s, cassava production
rose from 10% to 26%, largely replacing maize in parts of northern Zambia, where
it had been grown prior to the introduction of maize marketing and Fertiliser
subsidies (Govereh, Jayne, and Chapoto, 2008). Additionally, seed cotton’s share
has risen from 3% to 6% during the same time period (Zulu, Jayne, and Beaver,
2006; Jayne, Myers, and Nyoro, 2006). Unfortunately, this trend and gains from
crop diversification are now being stifled because the government is again moving
towards heavy subsidisation of maize production and marketing.
Another issue affecting productivity levels is the discrepancy between maize
planted and total harvests. Table 4 shows that only 55% - 80% of the total maize
area planted by smallholder farmers is actually harvested in Zambia (Table 4,
column C). This ranged from a low of 50.6% in 2004/05 (a drought year) to 83%
in 2003/04. Smaller farms (0-5 hectares) tend to have a slightly better harvesting
record when compared to medium-scale farm holders (5-20 hectares), but both
categories of smallholders face considerable unharvested areas.
Table 4: Comparison of area planted and harvested

Maize growing smallholder farmer % Area planted that was harvested
among maize growing households

2000/01

Maize area
planted (ha)

Maize area
harvested

533,279

417,892

627,529

476,493

(A)

2001/02

514,502

2003/04

589,036

2002/03

2004/05

2005/06

2006/07

2007/08

750,351

731,900

824,247

877,300

(B)

All smallholder Using
households
Fertiliser

Not using
Fertiliser

78.4

84.1

76.1

75.9

80.4

72.6

(C)

357,657

69.5

490,939

83.3

379,959

567,097

541,362

504,568

50.6

77.5

65.7

57.5

Source: Zambia CFS surveys, various years

(A)

77.3
86.9

53.1

86.2

76.0

63.7

(B)

66.0
80.6

49.1

71.2

57.7

52.2

5. Need to Match Stated Priorities with Implementation
The ability of an agricultural sector to sustain broad-based, pro-poor development
and food security is intricately linked to the stated priorities and actions of the
public sector. In Zambia, stated policy priorities do tend to exhibit a desire for
sustained agricultural development. The goal of the current policy thrust, for
example, revolves around diversification, improved productivity, and income
growth. The private sector is at the core of government policy which states as its
key objectives: (i) the reduction of production and marketing distortions on maize,
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(ii) the expansion of domestic utilisation of local products, and (iii) the improvement
of product competitiveness in regional markets.
However, due to frequent policy reversals and changing government mandates,
the policy environment is often uncertain. Survey evidence suggests that traders
perceive the agricultural input policy environment as especially unpredictable and
subject to change.4 As long as government involvement in input distribution and
output purchasing remains unpredictable, the private sector will not fully apply itself.
The perceived threat of government re-entry into the market ranks among the major
sources of risk for future investment (Wanzala et al., 2002; Govereh et al., 2002).
Politicians’ statements about private sector behaviour and the need for government
re-entry into markets have been a relatively neglected variable in the analyses of
private sector responses to reforms (Mwanaumo, 1999).
Government behaviour can adversely affect private sector decisions, and this
is particularly evident in marketing functions that require big initial investments,
such as long-distance transport, wholesaling, inter-seasonal storage, and Fertiliser
importation (Barrett, 1997; Stepanek, 1999). Much of the limited investment of this
type has been by larger, foreign-based firms with diversified portfolios that can
afford to take risks (Govereh et al., 2002). For marketing functions requiring
smaller capital outlays, such as retailing, assembly, and grain milling, private
sector investment response has been less affected by longer-term policy
uncertainty (Barrett, 1997).
There is widespread agreement that the food marketing policy environment
in the region has not effectively supported agricultural productivity growth for
millions of small farmers for several years. Many governments remain important
players in their maize markets, both through direct procurement and sale
operations, and through the use of discretionary trade policy. Though the
quantities they trade are smaller than during the controlled market era, marketing
boards are still a major presence in maize markets, handling between 20-50% of
total marketed volumes. Many countries in the region also continue to implement
various food price stabilisation programs. Government actions in the maize market
have become increasingly reactive and short-term in nature, subject to
unannounced policy changes that create major risks for private investment (Nijhoff
et al., 2002; Rubey, 2004).
Such uncertainty will translate into wide swings in both supply and price. In
2003, for example, Zambia experienced unwarranted price spikes due to the fact
that the government announced that it would import 200,000 metric tonnes of
grain and channel it to a few large scale millers. When this could not be attained
within the stated timeframe, prices of maize and mealie meal rose way above their
usual norm. This happened because the private sector sat back for fear of
suffering losses if they invested in procuring maize. Similarly in 2005, Zambia also
experienced an unbearable maize and maize meal price hike because of
government’s failure to implement it’s intentions to import maize. In addition, the
government announced very restrictive sanitary and phytosanitary requirements
discouraging private sector imports. The private sector did little and, instead,
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waited for the government to deliver the promised imports. Due to the year-long
wait coupled with seasonality aspects and increases in transportation costs, the
landed cost of the imported maize went up by 66% to US$320 from what it could
have been without the government-created uncertainties (US$210).
The 2008/09 marketing season provides another telling example, and it
began with official government estimates that the 2008 maize harvest would be
slightly below that of recent years, but would still provide a small surplus over
national consumption requirements. The FRA announced a buying price of
K45,000 per 50Kg bag (roughly US$260 per tonne) and continued the ban on
private exportation.5 Because of nervousness in the markets related to high world
food prices, private millers and traders started aggressively buying maize at
prices higher than the FRA floor price. The FRA responded by raising its buying
price to K55,000 per 50Kg bag (US$304) per tonne in an attempt to procure its
target supplies. Repeated aggressive buying attempts by both private traders
and the government pushed prices up quickly after the 2008 harvest. Upward
pressure on market prices has been compounded by perceptions that food
balance sheet estimates are likely to have underestimated the demand for maize.
Several key informants interviewed in September 2008, for example, indicated
that official food balance sheets underestimated the demand for maize from the
animal feed industry, the likely substitution in consumption from wheat to maize,
and the demand for maize in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and
Malawi through informal trade channels.
In June 2008, the Grain Traders Association of Zambia (GTAZ) informed the
Ministry of Agriculture that roughly 200,000 tonnes of maize was needed to fill
residual consumption requirements in early 2009. Private traders were free to
import on their own volition, but feared that the government might import as well
and then subsidise the sale price to millers, effectively undermining the market
for their own imported grain. In an attempt to ameliorate the situation, the GTAZ
sought to sign a memorandum of understanding with the government that would
have allowed them to import a given quantity without threat of simultaneous
government importation. The government refused such an agreement, claiming
that even if the private sector imports sufficient quantities to meet domestic
demand, the price levels obtained may be intolerably high and wanted to retain the
right to influence maize prices in the country.
As of November 2008, neither the government nor the private sector had
arranged to import maize. The maize price surface in Zambia quickly rose toward
import parity from South Africa. By December, retail maize prices were in the range
of US$350 to US$400 per tonne compared to US$176 per tonne on the SAFEX
exchange.
In December 2008, the government concluded that imports were necessary
and arranged for over 100,000 tonnes of maize to be imported from South Africa.
However, after a stock audit exercise by MACO and the promise by government
to subsidise mealie meal, the import requirements were revised downwards to
35, 000 metric tonnes, as millers, traders and other market participants had
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under declared their stocks. Unfortunately, the market prices at the time did not
suggest that there was enough grain to take the country through the hunger
period. Those with maize stocks were holding expensive grain given what had
transpired earlier in the season where both private buyers and FRA bid up the
price. The high domestic food prices could have been avoided were it not for
the difficulties between the public and private sector in agreeing on modalities
for importation.
With limited success, the government tried to control maize meal prices by
subsidising the price of maize paid by selected millers below market levels and
then requiring millers to pass along lower maize meal prices to consumers.
Despite this, grain and mealie meal prices remained high, and the government
ended the maize grain subsidy by March 2009. In hindsight, there were at least
five problems with how the government tried to react to the problem of rising grain
prices, especially on the Copperbelt. First, the overall quantities provided to millers
were not sufficient to satisfy consumer demand, causing prices to remain high.
Not all millers were able to access the cheaper maize provided by the FRA and
thus could not reduce their price. Secondly, that only a small proportion of the
registered millers in the country managed to receive subsidised grain from the
FRA led to questions about how recipient millers were selected, as well as
competition concerns from non-recipient millers. The government subsidy
programme encouraged non-competitive tendencies in the maize marketing
sector, and it is likely that the government will remain a cash cow for selected
millers as long as the Treasury is willing to pay. Other market players might also
try to lobby to have a piece of the pie, increasing further the burden on tax payers.
The subsidy also encouraged smuggling of both grain and mealie meal to
neighbouring countries, especially DRC and Zimbabwe. High policing costs and
increases in corruption levels call for law enforcement agencies and border
communities to be cautious. Given all these problems, one can conclude that
treasury payments intended to subsidise maize meal prices are frequently not
transmitted to consumers and that government intentions to help lower the prices
for poor consumers have largely gone to waste.

6. Do Farmer organisations have a Role in Agriculture?
Farmer organisations have become increasingly important in recent years as a
means to achieve farmer empowerment and agricultural development (United
Nations, 1993).6 A workshop in Nairobi, organised by the Food and Agricultural
Organisation (FAO) and the International Cooperative Alliance (ICA), has identified
the need to develop synergies among the public sector, the private sector and
civil society as a means to strengthen local level collective action (Bingen and
Rouse, 2002).
Experience with Farmer Groups
Many African countries make use of farmer organisations as a vehicle for
empowering smallholder farmers towards the acquisition of productive services
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and goods. The latest wave of collective action came with the 1990s push towards
liberalisation and the devolution of social, political and economic power to the
grassroots level. Institutions and legal frameworks have been reoriented to
formalise and support the formation of primary societies. In Zambia, farmer
organisations are supported by three acts: the 1998 Cooperative Societies Act
(primary cooperatives), the Societies Act (all society types, including unions, clubs,
and churches), and the Registration of Business Names Act (businesses and
companies).7
The government has continued to be active in service provision, alongside
private and non-governmental initiatives. Thus, in practice, three types of farmer
organisations have emerged: (i) those supported by NGOs; (ii) those supported
by private firms; and (iii) those formed to gain access to subsidised inputs through
government programmes. There is a need to further understand the effects of
these public and private sector initiatives on smallholder access to agricultural
services, and their ability to exploit economic opportunities. The characteristics of
these different types of farmer groups seem to suggest that they are typically
formed to attain differing objectives (see table 5). NGOs, for example, facilitate
formation of farmer organisations to help the most disadvantaged members of
rural communities. Members of NGO-supported groups have less than half the
income of those in the other two types of farmer organisations. Also, only one
percent of NGO farmer organisations have access to credit, compared to 5% and
8% for private and government farmer organisations.
Table 5: Types and attributes of farmer organisations in Zambia
Attribute
Legal status

Income levels of members (US$ per capita)
Access to credit (%)

Education of household head (years)

Female-headed households (%)

Type of farmer organisations
NGOsupported

Outgrower/
Government
Private supported
initiated

NR

NR

(1)
25
1

6

14

NR=Most not registered; R = Registration is a requirement

Source: Bingen et al. (2002)

(2)
55

(3)
R

51

5

8

16

10

5

5

In the 1999/00 agricultural season, 20% of all farmers had access to Fertiliser.
Within this group, 65% was attained and handled by the private sector. Postharvest survey data showed that most of the recipients of these inputs were
better-off farmers with higher farm and non-farm incomes, larger pieces of land,
and more educated household heads. Such households tended to have at least
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one member in the civil service. Only NGOs seemed to cater to the needs of the
less well-off farmers.
Since the creation of the Agricultural Sector Investment Program (ASIP), the
government has been encouraging private companies, governmental organisations
and NGOs to establish and assist smallholder groups. It is a requirement, for
example, for all recipients of Fertiliser subsidies through the FSP to be members
of registered farmer cooperatives. In most cases, district agricultural offices have
shown considerable support for the operations of farmer groups, including
incorporating smallholder representation on the District Agricultural Coordinating
Committees (DACs). The recent change in the name of the agriculture ministry to
the MACO8 seems to indicate the government’s desire to see farmer organisations
play a greater role as agents for agricultural services improvements.
Since the onset of these reforms, most NGOs and other donor-supported
projects have facilitated the formation of groups through which they render their
services to communities.9 Private companies, on the other hand, tend to use
contract farmers and established distributor systems. However, unlike
government-supported cooperatives and their NGO counterparts, these private
players have been less critical about the legal standing of their groupings. In fact,
almost all private sector initiated farmer groups are not legally registered.
Although in some cases government agents have facilitated community
empowerment efforts, such action is not adequately institutionalised. Often,
farmers have had to rely on donor-support through NGOs, which provide capacitybuilding support either directly to the farmer organisations (e.g., Cooperative
League of the U.S.A. (CLUSA)) or indirectly by training local agricultural staff (e.g.,
Economic Expansion in Outlying Areas (EEOA) in Mpika).

Opportunities for Group Empowerment
In Zambia, most of the successful farmer groups have a strong local leader
(Bingen et al., 2002). Thus, there is need to identify, nurture and make use of the
leadership capabilities and skills present in local communities. Such efforts need
to be complemented by the strengthening and empowering of local planning
bodies - farmer groups, local agricultural staff, etc. While NGOs may be effective
at facilitating group formation, they often cannot ensure sustainability. Most NGO
initiatives collapse as soon as the external supporting agency decides to withdraw
support.
A key ingredient to effective collective action is a recognition of the existing
social capital and investing in further strengthening such capital. Grootaert, Oh,
and Swamy (2002) define social capital as “…the institutions, relationships,
attitudes and values that govern interactions between people and contribute to
social and economic development.” It is structural (networks, associations,
institutions, rules and procedures) as well as cognitive (attitudes, norms, shared
values, reciprocity and trust, and governance) in nature (Uphoff, 2000). Farmer
organisations are diverse in nature and emerge for a variety of reasons, such as
production (access to factors of production), marketing (bulking up, market
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discovery, etc.), and consumption (Heemskerk and Wennink, 2004). This inherent
diversity demonstrates the need for strong synergies among the public sector,
private sector, and civil society. Thus, contrary to the currently existing populist
reform rhetoric, the government must become fully engaged in the process of
institutional change (Bingen and Rouse, 2002).
Even where group action exists, there are significant incentive problems and
issues of ownership benefits (free-rider problems, etc.). The new generation
cooperatives (NGC) are a recent innovation to try and correct the imbalances in
incentive structures. Specifically, NGCs seek to guarantee property rights through
clearly defined membership policies, ensuring a secondary market for members’
residual claims, imposing patronage and residual claimant status restrictions, and
providing enforceable member pre-commitment mechanisms (Cook and
Iliopoulos, 1999; Menard, 2000; Kotov, 2001; Waner, 2001). While these
innovations to collective action seem to be working well in developed countries,
their direct applicability to developing countries is not immediately guaranteed. A
lot of investment in support infrastructure and institutions, for example, is a must
and is unlikely to be achieved in the short term. However, it is important to start
thinking about these natural experiments and how they can be adapted to
Zambia’s specific circumstances. The need for public leadership in establishing
effective institutional innovations cannot be over-emphasised; nor can the need to
adapt to different socio-economic conditions.

Collective Action and Transaction Costs
Cooperatives and other forms of farmer organisations have the potential to reduce
transaction costs by facilitating the bulking up of both agricultural inputs and
output. Most agricultural production originates from smallholder farms, which are
geographically scattered and tend to produce very small surpluses. Under such
circumstances, and due to inherently high fixed costs, market participants have to
incur high costs in the absence of such cooperatives. Increasing returns to
marketing are not always guaranteed, however, and their existence is a function
of the level of market development, as well as other market-specific
characteristics.
Emran and Shilpi (2002) identify three stages of market development that
can affect the success of cooperatives in reducing transaction costs. In the first
stage, surpluses are virtually non-existent, the local market has no link with the
outside world, and market clearing occurs at the local level. Under such
circumstances, bulking up will lead to lower producer prices due to standard locallevel supply and demand relationships. Increased supply when demand is fixed
or inelastic has to be matched with a reduction in the market price if the market is
to clear. In the second and third stages, the market is developed somewhat and
is linked to long-distance trade with urban markets through traders. In this case,
the price in urban markets will play a role in the determination of local price. The
exact price received by farmers in the local market will depend on the magnitude
of marketing costs between the farmer and the urban market. Thus, reducing
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transaction costs through bulking can lead to pecuniary gains to farmers while
motivating them to produce more.
In the second stage, the surpluses of the single commodity of interest (e.g.,
maize) are not enough by themselves to guarantee such efficiency gains, to the
extent that the trader has to bulk up the surpluses of the commodity of interest with
surpluses of all other commodities that s/he can get in the community. In this case,
the cooperative movement has to be designed to handle multiple commodities
(e.g., maize with sorghum, millet, cotton, etc.). In the third and most developed
stage, the community produces enough of the commodity of interest to warrant
commodity-wise specialisation. In this case, there will be no gain in trying to set
up cooperatives that can handle multiple commodities. A recent study showed that
there are potential gains from bulking up in the Zambian maize market and that
no such gains could be realised from combining maize with other agricultural
commodities (Tembo and Jayne , 2007).

7. Conclusions and Policy Implications
This article uses existing empirical evidence to explain the dismal performance of
the maize sub-sector and to help inform options for possible corrective measures.
Contrary to conventional wisdom, the evidence suggests that the observed trends
are not due entirely to failed reforms. In fact, the government has been heavily
involved in direct participation in maize and input markets over the past decade,
both through the operations of the FRA, through the FSP, and through tight
controls on private trade through selective issuing of import and export licenses.
Hence an empirical assessment of the country’s performance since the 1990s
reflects not the impacts of unfettered and sharply encouraged market forces but
rather the mixed policy environment of legalised private trade within the context
of continued strong government operations in maize markets. Moreover, the
country’s mixed performance reflects a number of other factors, ranging from
failure to appreciate the smallholder production and marketing sector’s unique
structural characteristics to historical under-investment in broad-based, costreducing, infrastructure and institutions, and unpredictable and ad hoc trade policy
actions.
We identify seven major areas that need serious attention to help the
agricultural sector and agricultural marketing function better:
First, serious efforts to encourage market development and to ameliorate
market failure are likely to require an increased commitment to investment in
public goods (e.g., road, rail and port infrastructure, research and development,
agricultural extension systems, market information systems) and institutional
change in order to promote the functioning of market-oriented trading systems.
The government needs to prioritise investments in market infrastructure and
institutions over private goods and services, as public investment has greater
potential to sustain broad-based agricultural growth. This policy would thus require
a shift of focus from the Fertiliser subsidies and price support systems currently
in place to the development of cost-reducing infrastructure. However, care should
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be taken to focus on infrastructure with a high social payoff, which can be identified
through carefully designed cost-benefit analysis.
Second, policy discussions and subsequent decisions need to account for
the fact that actual budgetary allocations often differ in significant ways from
planned disbursements. Monitoring systems designed to increase budgeting
transparency and accountability might provide a method to reduce or eliminate
such differences.
Third, in the mixed policy environment, the government co-exists with the
private sector as an unfairly large competitor, and this hinders the development of
the agricultural sector. While total government withdrawal from the market may
not be a realistic or even helpful option, the government should avoid crowding out
private sector participation, and should instead seek to facilitate market growth. If,
however, the government insists on participating directly in agricultural markets,
it should be clear about its intentions to ensure predictability.
Fourth, there is evidence that restricting trade by using discretionary policies
such as export bans, import tariffs, and grain levies tends to hurt the market’s
ability to deliver food security for all. More empirical evidence on potential
alternatives that can avoid these negative effects is required. Recent evidence
has, for example, demonstrated that non-tariff impediments to trade exist between
Zambia and SADC regional counterparts. An understanding of these impediments
and how to avoid them might greatly enhance the government’s capacity to
implement effective policy.
Fifth, farmer organisations are generally recognised as valuable instruments
for attaining smallholder agricultural development. Because of the inherent
diversity in the conditions and needs of these groups, however, no single size
organisational mode can be prescribed. Fostering collective action therefore
requires an understanding of the varied needs of the clientele and their available
social capital, and the coordination of mutually re-enforcing investments by the
private sector, the public sector and the civil society. Because of the public good
nature of some important investments such as in contracts, technology, and
process, the government can actually play a leading role in the desired institutional
change. This is contrary to traditional thinking regarding such organisations, which
seems to advocate disengagement and a laissez-faire approach. Property rights
assurance is also generally recognised as an important ingredient to sustainable
collective action. Again, the need for public leadership in spearheading and
coordinating investments in the relevant support institutions cannot be overemphasised. Can Zambia, and other developing countries, learn from the
successes achieved by American agricultural producers with the new generations
approach to collective action? Although it is not immediately possible to adopt new
generation cooperatives, it is worth thinking about such options for the long run.
Sixth, farmer organisations also have potential to make marketing cheaper.
While the Tembo and Jayne (2007) study looked at the maize market, there is
need to establish the effectiveness of the cooperative movement in other value
chains. The cotton sector, for example, has established its own version of
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collective action and collective responsibility, established with very limited public
facilitation or involvement.
Last but not least, in discussing agricultural marketing policy and how it might
impact the sector, it is also important to understand the participants and their
abilities to respond. A clear understanding of the composition and structure of the
small and medium-scale farming community needs to be fully integrated into any
efforts to enhance market participation. This will better enable the government to
anticipate potential effects of alternative policy actions. There is need for more
research to continually monitor the likely impacts of alternative public actions and
policies on the target groups, paying particular attention to their varied
characteristics, opportunities and constraints. One-size-fits-all policies have, in
the past, been shown to be ineffective.
Notes:

Gelson Tembo is lecturer in the Department of Agricultural Economics, University of Zambia;
Anthony Chapota is visiting assistant professor in the Department of Agricultural, Food, and
Resource Economics, Michigan State University currently affiliated with the Ministry of
Agriculture/Consultative Forum/MATEP Food Security Research Project, Zambia; Thomas Jayne
is professor of International Development Department of Agricultural, Food, and Resource
Economics, Michigan State University and Michael Weber is professor of International
Development Department of Agricultural, Food, and Resource Economics, Michigan State
University.
1
2

In that system, the government performed most of the major marketing functions – input
distribution, output purchasing, storage, and transportation – an undertaking that enabled
pan-territorial pricing.
Defined by the Central Statistical Office (CSO) as farmers that cultivate no more than 20
hectares each year.

3. The CAADP recommendation is that each government attains at least 10 % budget allocation
to agriculture by 2008.

4. Sachs and Warner (1995) conclude that Africa is the only region of the world in which the
degree of openness has not significantly increased during the past two decades.

5. More technically, the government effectively bans exports by not issuing export permits,
which are required for legal trade of maize across borders. This stops the larger grain traders
from exporting. Small –volume informal trade tends to take place without export permits, but
this raises opportunities for border police to extract rents from traders, raising the costs of
trade.

6. A farmer organization is a local grouping of farmers established to attain a common set of
objectives.

7. See Chapters 119, 307 and 389 of the Laws of Zambia for details.
8. Formerly Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries (MAFF)

9. Examples include Farmer Research Groups (FRGs) by the provincial Adaptive Research
Planning Teams (ARPT), Farmer Extension Groups (FEGs) by CLUSA , Farmer Field
Schools (FFSs) by the ZNFU, etc.
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Appendix
Appendix Table A1: Chronology of Maize Marketing and Trade Policy Changes,
1990-2007
prior to
1990

• Importation, distribution, and pricing of maize handled by government
marketing agency, NAMBOARD. Pan-territorial and pan-seasonal maize
producer prices encourage production, especially in remote areas.
Government regulations prohibited private maize trade across districts.
NAMBOARD maize operations and allied credit for maize inputs accounted for
15% of government budget in the late 1980s, contributing to macro-economic
crisis.

1991/92 • Economic Structural Adjustment Program initiated in 1991. Donors provide
balance of payments support for fertiliser importation. Private trade legalised.
• NAMBOARD abolished in 1990, but fertiliser and credit marketing functions
transferred to other state agencies (Nitrogen Chemicals of Zambia (NCZ),
CLUSA, LIMA Bank and ZCF using a network of state-affiliated cooperatives).
1992/93 • Government removes import and export restrictions and liberalises foreign
exchange market.
• Maize meal subsidies reduced in late 1991. However, severe drought delays
maize market reform.
• Government sets floor price, into-mill, and consumer price of maize
1993/94 •
•
•
•
•

Government appoints rural banks and coops as buying agents for maize.
Government unable to maintain maize floor price.
Late arrival of food aid from prior year disrupts maize market.
Sharply appreciating Kwacha discourages maize exports.
Escalating interest rates dampen private sector interest in buying and storing
maize.

1994/95 • Government announces total decontrol of maize producer prices and
elimination of transport subsidies. But they also refer to pending floor prices.
• Value added Tax (VAT) introduced and maize and maize meal classified as
“exempt”.
• Politicians announce into-mill prices to allay consumer fears.
• Government states its intention to end buying agent system. But they continue
to provide credit to cooperatives and rural financial institutions to help collect
loans from farmers.
• Privatisation of state-owned milling companies.

1995/96 • First season where government refrains from announcing any prices and
private sector plays dominant role in input and commodity marketing.
• Real maize prices begin to rise. Government imposes an export ban on maize
grain and maize meal.
• Maize and maize meal VAT changed from “exempt rating” to “zero-rated”.
• Government begins leasing many storage warehouses to private traders and
transporters.
• Formulation of the Agricultural Sector Investment Program (ASIP), a tool for
implementing the government policy of maize market liberalisation and market
reform, 1994.
• Food Reserve Agency (FRA) established to manage the national food reserve.
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1997/98 • Food Reserve Agency takes over maize input distribution on credit to
smallholders.
• Donors cease financing of fertiliser imports.
• Pan-territorial pricing re-introduced for FRA-distributed fertiliser; makes private
sector fertiliser uncompetitive in outlying areas.
• Maize imported by government and sold to selected millers at US$160 per
tonne, 30% below prevailing market prices.
2001/02 • July 2001 food balance sheet estimates 200,000 tonnes import requirement
for maize. Import requirements are revised upward by some government
statements to 400,000 metric tonnes.
• August 2001 GRZ announces intention to arrange import of 200,000 metric
tonnes maize at subsidised prices. GRZ tenders to select importers, maize to
be delivered October 2001 through April 2002.
• Private traders do not import, despite high domestic prices, because of fear of
being undercut by subsidised government imports.
• Maize and maize meal VAT is zero rated, but export permits are not issued,
effectively banning legal private export of maize.
• Government financing of imports is delayed. Starting November 2001, food
shortages emerge and prices rise well above Cost, Insurance and Freight
(CIF) price level.
• Most government maize imports didn’t arrive until December 2001 and
January 2002 because of financing difficulties. CIF price reach US$220 to
US$260, far above import parity.
• By May 2002, only 130,000 tonnes had been imported under government
programme.
• Sales at subsidised price of US$160 per tonne into mills. Selected millers
receive subsidy of US$70 to US$100 per tonne of maize purchased.
• Government proposes the Crop Marketing Authority (CMA) as a semiautonomous body corporate, a buyer of last resort whose main preoccupation
is to stabilise prices and create markets in remote areas while procuring and
selling at market prices and remaining self-sustaining.

2002/03 • Millers’ purchases of maize from the 2002 maize harvest are depressed by the
availability of subsidised imported maize from the preceding drought year.
• Government pressure on the millers to keep the maize meal price low
constrains demand for locally produced maize, which is available at relatively
high prices due to poor harvest season.
• The food balance sheet estimated that the 2002 harvest would lead to a food
deficit of 600,000 tonnes. Consequently, an abnormally early price increase was
observed in June 2002. Traders began to buy up maize in anticipation of further
price increases based on the experiences of the 2001/2002 marketing season.
• Government entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with the millers to
import 300,000 metric tonnes, government to import 180,000 metric tonnes as
food relief and 120,000 metric tonnest as reserves.
• The flow of imports was, however, slow because of a ban on genetically
modified organism (GMO) maize. Relief operators had to revisit their pipeline
in order to supply non-GMO maize.
2003/04 • Relatively good maize harvest. Maize and maize meal zero rated for VAT
purposes.
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2004

2005

2006
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• Government imports in response to the 2002 harvest were late in arriving,
some only arriving as the 2003 harvest was being offered for sale. Several
thousand tonnes of maize imports costing as much as US$270/tonne were
arriving in Zambia as farmers were offering their new crop at prices below
US$ 180/tonne. This scenario fuelled mutual mistrust between government
and private sector in the maize market.
• Export permits not issued, effectively banning maize exports.
• Government legislation gives powers to local authorities to introduce local
taxes. Inter-district grain levies put in place. In some districts, taxes on maize
amount to roughly 10% of the price received by farmers for maize. These
taxes indirectly impede the profitability of commercialised production.

• Maize and maize meal VAT status changes to “exempt”.
• Government raises maize import duty to 15%.
• MACO sets up task force to provide planning guidelines for the establishment
of the proposed Crop Marketing Authority (CMA).
• Millers lobbied for a lifting on the export ban on maize, in order to maintain
demand and remunerative producer prices for maize farmers.
• Government issues export permits to selected trading/milling firms.
• Ministry of Agriculture and the Zambian National Farmers’ Union requests for
an Agricultural Marketing Development Plan to be drawn, to structure MACO’s
agricultural marketing policies and programmes.

• National Food Balance Sheet presented to government showing an import
requirement of 85,000 metric tonnes, but private sector estimates are 150,000 tonnes.
• Millers request import permits from MACO and duty waiver from MFNP.
• In September, MACO announces a temporary waiver of import duty and
issues import permits for 150,000 tonnes to millers and 50,000 tonnes to FRA.
FRA purchases 120,000 metric tonnes from domestic market at above market
prices in deficit year.
• MFNP refuses to waive the import duty.
• After heavy lobbying by all the stakeholders, MFNP agrees in late October to
waive duty. MACO issues import permits.
• Millers begin to contract for imports.
• FRA releases 50,000 tonnes of maize at US$210/tonne in December,
undercutting importers (CIF import price stands at US$266-287);
• MACO advised private sector to stop importing because they are failing to
comply with new phytosanitary regulations.
• President Mwanawasa declares a national disaster at the request of
Parliament.
• Mount. Makulu issues phytosanitary clearance; permits imports to resume
after a four-week delay.
• President Mwanawasa announces that millers should lower maize prices
significantly due to the abrupt strengthening of the Kwacha (up 26% in two
weeks). Stakeholders meet with MACO to discuss the maize situation.
• Import duty waiver extended to 31st March.

• Good harvest; FRA instructed to purchase 386,000 tonnes of maize at
US$190 per tonne to support maize prices.
• FRA price attracts maize from Mozambique and Tanzania supplied by traders.
• FRA allocated ZK150 billion and borrowed ZK150 billion but prospects of

Gelson Tembo, Anthony Chapoto, Thomas Jayne, and Michael Weber

2007

2008

selling at a loss puts doubt on ability to repay the loan independent of
subventions from the Treasury.
• Government restricts export permits to traders and provides FRA with de facto
monopoly on the export of maize; some traders and farmers allowed to use
FRA export permit later in the season.
• FRA has difficulty selling the maize in local markets due to good harvest and
because of the above-market prices at which they purchased.
• Maize stock monitoring committee put in place to report on stocks monthly.
MACO’s rationale is to guarantee national reserves before issuing export
permits and to supply maize meal at affordable prices.

• 250,000 tonnes FRA carryover stock largest in FRA history;
• FRA sought government approval to dispose of its old stock below the
breakeven price by exporting to Zimbabwe at a loss.
• FRA targets to purchase record crop of 400,000 tonnes by increased depots
to 620 in 62 districts – 10 satellite depots per district and 62 holding depots.
• Target for strategic reserves revised from 80,000 tonnes to 200,000 tons.
• FRA to pay ZK39000 per 50kg bag and continues to attract maize from
Tanzania and Mozambique.
• Minister of Agriculture and Cooperatives issues statement to begin allocation
of export quotas to associations: Millers Association of Zambia (MAZ), ZNFU
and GTAZ only.
• FRA issued with export permit for 226,000 tonnes, MAZ issued with 50,000
tonnes, GTAZ got permit for 50,000 tonnes and ZNFU had permit for 50,000
tonnes and there is a balance of 50,000 tonnes not issued.
• ZNFU not ready to use 2006/07 allocation, keep extending the permit. Millers
and traders quick to utilise their allocation.

• May 2008 food balance sheet showed a small surplus over national
consumption requirements.
• Stakeholders doubted the food balance sheet estimates arguing that demand
side was underestimated.
• FRA announced a buying price of 45,000 kwacha/tonne (roughly US$
260/tonne). No export permits issued essentially banning private exportation.
• Because of nervousness in the markets related to high world food prices,
private millers and traders started the 2008 season by aggressively buying
maize at prices higher than the FRA floor price.
• The FRA countered by raising its buying price to 55,000 kwacha (US$304)
per tonne in an attempt to procure its target supplies.
• Aggressive attempts by both private traders and the government pushed
prices up quickly after the 2008 harvest.
• In June of 2008, the GTAZ informed the Ministry of Agriculture that roughly
200,000 tonnes of maize would be required to fill residual consumption
requirements in early 2009.
• In July/August, government refused to sign Memorandum of Understanding
with GTAZ assuring them that the government would not import and sell grain
to millers at subsidised prices.
• In September, FSRP policy synthesis advising government how to respond
was essentially ignored.
• By November neither the government nor the private sector had arranged to
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•

•

•

•

import maize. Food shortages emerge and the maize price surface quickly
rose beyond import parity from South Africa.
As of December 2008,
○ retail maize prices were in the range of US$350 to US$400 per tonne
compared to US$176 per tonne on the SAFEX exchange.
○ The government concluded that indeed imports would be necessary and
contracted for over 100,000 tonnes of maize to be imported from South
Africa revised downwards to 35,000 metric tonnes after stock audit.
○ GRZ started subsidising the price of maize paid by selected millers below
market levels and then requiring millers to pass along lower maize meal
prices to consumers.
○ Maize grain and maize meal prices remained high.
In January, the maize imported by a private contractor was discovered to be
GMO maize and rejected by FRA.
In February 2009, traders were able to sell 40 000 of the 55 000 metric tonnes
to FRA at US$409.05 per tonne after protracted negotiations.
In March,
○ government announced the intent to discontinue subsidies to millers at the
end of March 2009 as they were not effective enough in reducing consumer
mealie meal prices.
○ As a result, millers announced that breakfast meal prices were to increase
by K10,000 if subsidies were ended.
○ FRA announces the sale of subsidised 2500 metric tonnes to feed stock
industry to cushion rising feed prices.

Sources: Howard 1994; Pletcher 2000; Jayne et al. 1999; Mwanaumo 1999; Govereh et
al. 2008; Jayne et al. 2009
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